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INAUGURAL HOWARD LICHTENSTEIN LECTURE
IN LEGAL ETHICS: LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
AS A MORAL ARGUMENT
Thomas L. Shaffer*
The recurrent movement to call or recall lawyers to professionalism is a
moral argument. It is an argument made to individual lawyers, a claim among
lawyers, that professionalism has to do with being a good person. I propose
to discuss that claim with you today, and in doing so to salute, in a modest
way, the generosity of the late Mr. Lichtenstein's law firm (Proskauer, Rose,
Goetz, and Mendelsohn) to your university.'
I also hope to salute my friend and colleague in legal ethics, your
Lichtenstein Professor, Monroe H. Freedman. I can hardly think of a moral
issue among lawyers, during my thirty years in the profession, that Professor
Freedman has not enriched because he paid attention to it. His attention to
moral questions has been peculiarly important for us because he, more than
anyone else in the field, refuses to be hoodwinked by pretension or
humbugged by phrases.2 He is always clear-sighted and never destructive;
he addresses our critical moral worries with learned clarity, with energy, and
with good will. He makes the profession better by being in it. I am honored
to be invited to Hofstra to inaugurate a lecture series that will, I trust, flourish
as one of the benefits to Hofstra of Monroe Freedman's Howard Lichtenstein
Professorship.
I see two aspects to the claim that professionalism is a moral value: one
aspect says to a person "be professional." It is an admonition to virtue.3 The
*Professor Shaffer is the Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law at the University
of Notre Dame. Professor Shaffer presented this speech at Hofstra University's Inaugural
Howard Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics, October 31, 1989.
1. Mr. Lichtenstein was a partner in the law firm and a prominent labor lawyer and
community leader. He graduated from New York University in 1929, cum laude, and from
its law school in 1932. He was a friend and supporter of the new law school at Hofstra
University.
2. See Temple, Monroe Freedman and Legal Ethics: A Prophet in His Own Time,
13 J. LEGAL PROF. 233 (1988). This article lists most of Professor Freedman's major
publications.
3. On a spectrum of specificity in admonitions to virtue, "be professional" is in the
middle. It has broader moral force than pointing to a good habit, such as "be brave," or "be
compassionate"; "be professional" seems more like invoking a way of life. But it is more
specific than what is sometimes called the first principle in ethics (do good and avoid evil),
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other aspect says to a person, "be in the profession-be of it," with an appeal
that seems familiar from other admonitions we have heard to align ourselves
with groups4 that are supposed to make us better persons: Join the youth
group at the temple, or at the church; be a Scout; if you want to meet nice
people don't go to bars.5 Let's look at these two aspects of professionalism
one at a time.
I. BE PROFESSIONAL
Is it the case that to be professional is a way for a lawyer to be a good
person?6 The most prominent support for an affirmative answer to that
question, at the moment, is the professionalism campaign of the American
Bar Association. This campaign started in 1984, when Chief Justice Warren
Burger said he thought the Bar in the United States was "moving away from
the principles of professionalism."7 He recommended that the Association
since it refers to one's work; it is narrower than "be a good boy," which is what my
grandmother said to me every morning, regardless of what I had done or was planning to
do. See G. MEILAENDER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VIRTUE (1984); A. MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? ch. 7 (1988).
4. This second aspect of "be professional" depends on the possibility that there are
groups that can make us better persons. In the Aristotelian tradition that possibility rests
on the virtue of friendship. See G. MEILAENDER, FRIENDSHIP: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL
ETHICS (1981); Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, 30 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 619
(1977); Cooper, Friendship and the Good in Aristotle, 86 PHIL. REv. 290 (1977); A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY ch. 14 (1981); T. SHAFFER,
FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS chs. 5 and 6 (1987).
5. Looking at "be professional" in these two ways excludes a third aspect of the
recurrent movement for lawyer professionalism, an aspect that speaks to a group of lawyers,
that says to them collectively, "be a profession." I am going to leave that aspect aside. It
is interesting for ethics because it is profoundly susceptible to collective self-deception. See
H. FNGARETrE, SELF-DECEPTION (1960); S. HAUERWAS, TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY ch.
5 (1977). Another ethical issue that is consequent on a group being a profession is whether
the moral teachings it formulates weaken more general moral teachings in the culture. See
Macntyre, Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?, 67 THE' MONIST 498 (1984).
6. At this point in a discourse of this sort, someone usually wants to know what I
mean when I write about being a "good person." I suppose that a good person is one who
seeks to perfect his human abilities and so to flourish. This is the Greek idea of goodness
in a person; it is earthy and practical: It says that if you (try to) perfect your abilities, you
will be happy. In the Hebraic (Jewish and Christian) religious tradition we say that a human
ability is perfected when it functions according to the purposes for which God made it.
That may be different from the Greek idea, but it is not, in my Catholic moral tradition,
inconsistent with it. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 3, ch. 10.
7. 112 F.R.D. 243, 248 (1986).
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study the matter, which it did. A Commission of the Association responded
two years later, in a report that was published in the Federal Rules
Decisions.' The title of the report was in part borrowed from Dean Roscoe
Pound and in part taken from a garden of hybrid metaphors the A.B.A. keeps
for its committees. The first part of the title is "In the Spirit of Public
Service." That is Dean Pound's part. The second part is "A Blueprint for the
Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism." That's from the garden. (It leaves
you wondering whether you are supposed to start the fire with the blueprint.)
The report initiated a broader "study" that has become a single-minded
campaign. Lawyer professionalism has a national office, a logo, its own
journal (called The Professional Lawyer), and a budget. I suppose it has, or
soon will have, a motto, a constitution, and a mascot. If you are a lawyer and
you haven't heard about the A.B.A. campaign for professionalism, you
probably haven't heard about The Maine, Plymouth Rock, or the Golden
Rule.
The appeal to "principles of professionalism," first by the Chief Justice,
then by the writers of the 1986 Report, and finally by the broader apparatus
the A.B.A. puts behind its campaigns, is a more specific moral appeal than it
seems to be. The claim that to be professional is to be a good person depends
here on a particular, unmentioned, remembered image of what a good person
in the legal profession is. The professionalism campaign is a nostalgic appeal
to a particular kind of moral leadership, a particular kind of prominence and
power, to the memory we have of the lawyer titans who ruled America, and
whose hold on power began, a generation ago, to slip away.
Let me see if I can demonstrate what I mean, first, in ethical theory. The
Report talks about virtue. It uses virtue words to describe its moral ideal for
lawyers-words such as honor, fidelity, trust, honesty, patriotism,
8. See Morris, Jr., Chairman's Message: Some Thoughts on Professionalism, 41 Bus.
LAW., Aug. 1986, at xv (for expansion, commentary, and obedience); Mengis, Professional
Responsibility, 49 LA. L. REV. 487 (1988); Pearson, The Guiding Restraint of the
Professional Spirit, 24 GoNz. L. REV. 203 (1988-89); Hostetler, Professionalism on Video,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 138; Meaning of Professionalism, PROF. LAW., Summer 1989, at
16; Miller, Self-Regulation: The Essence of Professionalism, RES GESTAE, July 1989, at 5;
R.I. Bar Assoc., A Lawyer's Creed of Professionalism, R.I. B.J., Oct. 1989, at 5; Stanley,
Professionalism and Commercialism, 50 MoNT. L. R. 1 (1989); Wash. St. Bar Assoc.,
Report by the W.S.BA. Task Force on Professionalism, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS, March 1989,
at 9; White, Professionalism and the Law School, 19 CUMB. L. R. 309 (1989). See also
sources cited infra notes 27, 39, and 44.
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selflessness, integrity, fairness, independence, courage, and devotion. Virtue
words, as distinguished from principle words, speak about moral qualities.
Aristotle and his teachers and his students taught morals by describing the
virtues they noticed in admirable people. So do the Scouts, as in the Scout
Law: "A Scout is loyal, friendly, trustworthy, clean," etc.9
The virtues are good habits. Modem virtue writers 0 call them
dispositions or characteristics-the latter word suggesting that they are the
constituents of good character. This way of looking at our moral lives is
focused on being good, rather than being right." Principle words, by
contrast, speak of things that should be done, right and wrong actions that
must be chosen; of moral dilemmas; and of rival courses of action in
particular situations. Virtue words focus on persons more than on actions; on
good habits rather than quandaries and choices. 2
9. The grandfather and founder of American legal ethics, the eccentric Baltimore
lawyer David Hoffman (1784-1854), also followed this procedure. Hoffman, Resolutions
on Professional Deportment, reprinted in T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS ch. 2
(1985). I organized his resolutions into a conventional list of moral virtues: justice, civility
[tolerance], prudence, courage, and fraternity [friendship].
10. A. MACINTYRE, supra notes 3 and 4; S. HAUERWAS, CHARACTER AND THE
CHRISTIAN LIFE: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (1975); J. MCCLENDON, BIOGRAPHY
AS THEOLOGY (1974).
11. Philip Rhinelander, an academic moral philosopher, said, in a talk to a conference
of journalists at Stanford, in 1978:
When we make ethical judgments about persons we generally use terms like
good and bad in the sense of virtuous or vicious. When speaking of acts or
behaviour, we generally use terms like right or wrong in the sense of praise-
worthy or blameworthy .... The great classical writers considered that
character was fundamental. Consequently they stressed the importance of
developing virtues, or dispositions of character, such as courage, wisdom,
temperance and the like. For them rules about particular kinds of conduct were
secondary and derivative. By contrast, a legalistic approach to ethics begins
with rules about particular kinds of conduct and makes virtues secondary. The
first approach... puts more weight upon the judgment of the individual. It
emphasizes the need for practice and training, because acquiring virtue is like
acquiring any other skill .... [T]he ultimate standard is the model of the
virtuous person: what he or she would do is the test of what is right.
See T. SHAFFER, supra note 9, at 70.
12. See Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (1988)
(attempts to describe a legal ethics of character and to then relate character to the
communities from which lawyers come). This is a project in legal ethics that builds on
arguments made in my book entitled FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS and is continued in my
book entitled AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES (1991). See also Shaffer,
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Virtue words are particular. In the ethical classics these words are
defined with reference to particular persons in particular cultures at particular
times and places. In Aristotle, for example, on the man of practical wisdom
in fifth century (B.C.E.) Athens; 3 in American Jewish culture on the mensch
among the late immigrants; 14 in Italian-American culture on the American
paesano of the period before America closed its doors to Italians; 15 and,
among British and American lawyers, on the nineteenth-century
gentleman.' 6 I think the A.B.A.'s unidentified ideal, when it speaks of
professionalism with virtue words, and when it claims that to be professional
is to be a good person, is the American gentleman-lawyer. The virtues the
A.B.A. describes are virtues we know, because we know lawyers who have
those virtues. We might say-and a generation ago we would have said-that
we know what these lawyer virtues are because we know lawyers who are
gentlemen.
To speak in this way of the virtues in an occupation is to say that the
worthy practice of that occupation requires moral training-what the
medieval Scholastics called formation: The practice of the profession is a
moral art. Being a professional means being formed to act morally, being
formed in certain habits. You learn these moral habits as you learn your craft;
you learn them from elders in your calling. Moral skills and craft skills
infiltrate one another, so that it is not possible to separate moral skills from
skills that have to do with the craft. You perfect your practice of one kind of
skill as you perfect your practice of the other, with companions in your
calling. 7
Virtues, then, are both like and distinguishable from skills in
craftsmanship. They are something you learn and perfect as you grow, more
than they are something you choose. The moral masters from whom we learn
and with whom we perfect these virtues, in the A.B.A.'s unidentified model,
are the lawyers, judges, professors, and deans whose portraits hang on the
inside walls of our law buildings and in the hallways of our law offices. The
Lawyers as Assimilators and Preservers, 58 MIss. L.J. 405 (1988).
13. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 3, chs. 6, 7, and 8.
14. A reference I owe to Professor Freedman.
15. Shaffer & Shaffer, Character and Community: Rispetto as a Virtue Among
Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1989).
16. Shaffer, The Gentlemen in Professional Ethics, 10 QUEENS L.J. 1 (1984).
17. S. HAUERWAS, supra note 5; Shaffer, On Being a Professional Elder, 62 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 624 (1987).
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A.B.A. 's professionalism campaign thus does not rest on a theory. It does not
rest on an argument. It rests on a memory and on a person.
The A.B.A. campaign would be more insightful and more persuasive if
it were to admit the dependence. The reason you don't see the campaign
identifying the person it remembers is that to admit to the potence of such a
memory would be to recognize that lawyer professionalism is at odds with the
popular American value of equality. The gentleman's ethic, in and out of the
legal profession, has always implied that gentlemen are superior people. The
A.B.A. campaign, if it were to admit that what it is pushing is the old-
fashioned, American lawyer-gentleman's ethic, would find itself involved in
a latter-day defense of elitism--of a superiority the gentleman-lawyer has
always taken for granted.
The Commission instead focused its virtue language on the "integrity"
of the good lawyer.' 8 We know what integrity means in the life of a good
lawyer (the Report does not have to define it for us), because we know good
lawyers-parents, relatives, neighbors, elders in our religious congregations,
and the lawyer-heroes of our novels and television programs. 9 Older,
integrated professional people are familiar in our culture; invoking them in
this way is a natural thing to do, and it does not at first raise an issue about
superiority. To say that a person has integrity does not seem to imply a class
distinction.
But to say that the particular integrity of the good lawyer is his
professionalism-to tie integrity to professionalism--does imply a class
distinction: A candid appeal to such particularized integrity would involve,
I think, an appeal to the ideal of the American gentleman-lawyer, and that
would identify a class distinction. The gentleman-lawyer is a substantive
figure in our culture. The A.B.A. can invoke him-and, in my view, it
does-but it cannot fashion him to its own purposes; it cannot deny him his
assumption of superiority or hide his assumption of superiority behind the
word integrity."
18. Integrity means wholeness, being integrated, together, solid, purposeful, not
arrogant but still sure of yourself-sure enough to proceed, anyway. See S. LETWIN, THE
GENTLEMAN IN TROLLOPE: INDMDUALITY AND THE MORAL CONDuCT ch. 5 (1982); C. G.
JUNG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE TRANSFERENCE 103-04 (R.F.C. Hill trans. Bolligen ed.
1969); C. G. JUNG, ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY 137-38 (1968).
19. T. SHAFFER, supra note 4, ch. 1.
20. Integrity and superiority are not inconsistent. The nineteenth century gentleman's
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Consider Southern gentleman-lawyers in our modem fiction, lawyers
such as Atticus Finch of To Kill a Mockingbird, or William Faulkner's Gavin
Stevens. The culture these novels describe depends on such people; they are
responsible for everything. They are a ruling class. Alexis de Tocqueville
called them the only American aristocrats.2 '
Consider the solid senior lawyers of Louis Auchincloss' New York City,
big-firm lawyer stories or of James Gould Cozzens's stories of lawyers in
small-town Pennsylvania or lawyers in the nineteenth century Yankee stories
of William Dean Howells. These lawyers are the architects of their
societies.22
And, most telling of all in terms of the current marketability of what I
believe to be the Report's allusion to the gentleman-lawyer, consider the wise
elders who have been for thirty-five years the pillars of television stories
about lawyers: Lawrence Preston of The Defenders, Andy Griffith as
Matlock, the elder lawyer who presided over The Young Lawyers, Leland
McKenzie of LA. Law.23 These elders are the teachers and carriers of the
ideal claimed both, as in General Robert E. Lee's famous definition:
The forebearing use of power does not only form a touchstone, but the
manner in which an individual enjoys certain advantages over others is a test
of a true gentleman.
The power which the strong have over the weak, the employer over the
employed, the educated over the unlettered, the experienced over the confiding,
even the clever over the silly-the forebearing or inoffensive use of all this
power or authority, or a total abstinence from it when the case admits it, will
show the gentleman in a plain light. The gentleman does not needlessly and
unnecessarily remind an offender of a wrong he may have committed against
him. He can not only forgive, he can forget; and he strives for that nobleness
of self and mildness of character which impart sufficient strength to let the past
be but the pasL A true man of honor feels humbled himself when he cannot
help humbling others.
D. FREEMAN, ROBERT E. LEE 499 (1935).
21. A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835). The relevant passage is
excerpted in T. SHAFFER, supra note 9, at 100-01.
22. They use the law to make their communities work. Perhaps they are not so much
aristocrats as they are technocrats. Auchincloss has, however, portrayed them as favoring
the imagery of art and avoiding technological imagery. See L. AUCHINCLOSS, THE GREAT
WORLD AND TIMOTHY COLT (1956); see also T. SHAFFER, supra note 9, chs. 6 and 7.
23. What I am thinking about with regard to Mr. McKenzie is the way he trains the
young lawyers in his firm in moral skills (the virtues, good habits) as he trains them in legal
craftsmanship. In this he is like Dr. Mark Craig of "St. Elsewhere" or Captain Furillo of
1990/911]
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
skills of lawyering, as Holmes would have said, in the grand manner, they are
personifications of the claim that moral skill and craftsmanship are
inseparable.
I suspect that most of the members of the A.B.A. Commission would
admit that they yearn for the return of the gentleman-lawyer. But the
Commission could not admit the yearning, and there are good reasons why it
did not. The most obvious reason is that the profession is on its way to being
half women, and speaking of women as gentlemen is problematic. It is even
problematic to use that word for men who are not white Protestants. Atticus
Finch and Gavin Stevens and Howells' and Auchincloss' Yankee lawyers are
all male, all white, all Protestants, all from upper middle-class families and
they all accept that it is in the natural order of things for lawyers to come only
from such backgrounds.
Suppose, nonetheless, that the A.B.A. campaign were to pause, reflect,
and admit its dependence on the image, notion, and tradition that these stories
and shared experiences describe for Americans, and especially for Americans
who are lawyers. Suppose these campaigners were to derive from those
reflections a gentleman-lawyer's ethic, to call that ethic professionalism, and
to put it up for discussion. The A.B.A. probably won't do that-for the
reasons I mentioned-but I would like to do it (and have done it24) anyway.
What I find is that the ethic of the American gentleman-lawyer is like
Lincoln's Second Inaugural. It is a beautiful and melancholy thing. Not
useful for slogans, sermons, and videotapes from Chicago, but still useful for
thinking about the morals of lawyers and the tragic dimensions of turning
professionalism into a moral argument.
The gentleman-lawyer is melancholy because he is responsible for the
way things are. He is implicated in injustice. He is, as the old civil rights
movement used to say it, part of the problem. What makes him somber,
rather than merely guilty, is this: He knows that he knows. He is the sort of
leader C. P. Snow's professor-character, Roy Calvert, said he wanted as the
"Hill Street Blues." All three professional elders teach through example as well as
instruction; none are paragons, but all three take responsibility for what is happening around
them-which is to say that each of them has moments when he finds that he has to forgive
himself in order to get along. Cf. Machlowitz, Lawyers on TV, 74 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1988,
at 52. See Rosen, Ethical Soap: "LA. Law" and the Privileging of Character, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1229 (1989).
24. Shaffer, supra note 16.
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master of his college: A person who has to forgive himself in order to get
along. The gentleman-lawyer is able to function in a moral universe because
he admits his complicity in the evil that is around him, the evil that supports
his power and the power of his clients.
This is the lesson the children in To Kill a Mockingbird learned as they
waited outside the courthouse where Tom Robinson was being condemned:
Atticus Finch is a champion against injustice, a gentleman-lawyer, an
aristocrat, and a governor in a racist society-as Howells' lawyers have
integrity and are governors in a society that exploits the late immigrants, and
Cozzens's lawyers sustain small-town Pennsylvania and are anti-semitic. The
awareness of complicity is the sadness, and often the bitterness, in
Auchincloss' lawyers. Gentleman-lawyers in New York City are responsible
for, and profit from, the unmerited privilege, the discrimination, the
oppression of the poor, that is around them.25 They have to get up and go
on in order to be lawyers. They have to forgive themselves to get along.26
When the Illinois State Bar Association held a public and published
discussion of the 1986 report on professionalism, a member of the A.B.A.
Board of Governors accused the Commission of being too hard on lawyers.
She said lawyers should praise themselves. She implied that a principal
purpose of the campaign27 for professionalism should be to raise self-esteem
25. Brown, Kaufman, & Hildebrandt, Has the Rise of Megafirms Endangered
Professionalism?, 75 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1989, at 38.
26. The literary contrast is the lawyer who quits being a lawyer. I think of Howells'
troubled Puritan lawyer in A Modern Instance who leaves the law and becomes a minister,
and of scores of young lawyers I know who, from an array of religious traditions, but
usually for religious reasons, renounce litigation and work in a peacemaking practice that
is lived at the fringes of lawyer professionalism. These lawyers and ex-lawyers raise a
different moral issue than the one I mean to identify by talking about the melancholy
lawyer-gentleman. They raise the issue of when to exit from an unjust society. The
gentleman-lawyer does not raise that issue; his ethic is an ethic that denies the possibility
of exit. He sees injustice more clearly than others in his time and place, and he works to
redress injustice more resolutely than they do, but he cannot leave. That is the lesson
Faulkner's- Gavin Stevens gives to his nephew Chick in Intruder in the Dust and Atticus
Finch gives to his son (but not so much to his daughter) in Harper Lee's To Kill a
Mockingbird. The gentleman-lawyer's ethic depends on the moral adequacy of the
community he cannot leave and, for this reason among others, his ethic is inadequate-a
"sub-cult" of the sustaining communities described as Israel and the People of God, by our
Hebraic theology. See Shaffer, supra notes 16 and 17.
27. Rotunda, Professionals, Pragmatists, or Predators, 75 ILL. B.J. 420, 421 (1987)
(quoting Martha W. Barnett).
1990/91]J
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
among lawyers. She may even have been arguing that the allusion to the
gentleman-lawyer is a mistake; that would be the ethical implication in an
argument for praising lawyers: If praising lawyers is what professionalism
means, the A.B.A. would do better to avoid Leland McKenzie and allude
instead to the less sententious television lawyers who function at a distance
from the evil that is around them. A campaign to praise lawyers requires
television characters who get by on righteous indignation, modem literary
lawyers (not often called gentlemen) who claim to be the victims of
oppression rather than the custodians of it. (I mean Grace Van Owen, Victor
Sifuentes, and Michael Kuzak-rather than Leland McKenzie.) The
campaign for professionalism would then describe lawyers as part of the
solution, rather than as part of the problem.
To accept the praise-lawyer's suggestion on professionalism would be
to avoid the gentleman, and to be incoherent in the use of professionalism as
a moral word. Invoking the gentleman-lawyer is, by contrast, a coherent,
interesting, serious, tradition-based, vital way to make the argument, "be
professional." The issue for the A.B.A. campaigners is whether they are
serious about it. Do they understand they are talking about a serious but
somber ethic? I see a couple of indications that the A.B.A. does not know
that.
(1) The Commission's report lays prominence on lawyers who are
legislators or who work in legislatures: "[L]awyers should put aside self-
interest and should support legislation that is in the public interest." 2 That
principle is an old one among American gentlemen-lawyers; the grandfather
of American legal ethics, David Hoffman, taught his law students that a
gentleman-lawyer should not advocate any legal change that is not good for
the country.29
But the A.B.A. makes an exception that Hoffman refused to make:
Lawyers representing clients may advocate legislation that is not good for the
country; in that case, the report says, "[tlhe legislature is presumed to be able
to discern the public interest. ,30 Somewhere between Hoffman's day (he
28. 112 F.R.D. 243, 264 (1986).
29. Hoffman, supra note 9, Resolution XIV: "[S]hould the principle ... be wholly
at variance with sound law, it would be dishonourable folly in me to endeavor to incorporate
it into the jurisprudence of the country...."
30. 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986). See also Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and Unsound
Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REv. 697 (1988).
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died in 1854) and our own, professionalism stopped meaning that lawyers are
responsible for justice. My point is not to endorse either position on the
principle, it is rather, to say that either way you take the principle-whether
you say that lawyers should advocate client interests only if those interests are
good for the country, or that lawyers should advocate client interests with
loyalty and leave the good of the country to others-living the principle
honestly is a melancholy business. It is like what Shirley Letwin noticed, in
her study of the gentleman-hero in Trollope's novels. The gentleman may lie
to protect his friend, she said, but he will not pretend that he has not lied.31
The gentleman-lawyer may forsake the common good in order to serve his
client, but he will not pretend that his doing so serves the common good.
(2) The A.B.A. campaign contrasts professionalism and commercialism.
An ethic of profit, which the Report implies is an acceptable ethic in business,
is not acceptable in a profession.3 z That is an odd argument; if it is truthful,
it is an ethic of complicity or a piece of one.
"Commercialism" is the source and cause of professional opulence, and
the A.B.A. endorses opulence. It accepts the principle that lawyers should be
paid well so that they can live well. But living well means that lawyers are
paid from the profits of commercialism. The campaign disapproves of the
commercial lawyer and excuses the lawyer who is paid from commercial
profits. Those who practice commercialism do not act in a spirit of public
service; those who are paid from commercialism to practice law do.
I may be too harsh. Maybe that distinction can be made to work. I have
not been able to work it out in a way that does not make lawyers an elite corps
of wealth transferors (and that way of working it out seems not worth the
trouble). 33 It seems to me more truthful and more hopeful-and the A.B.A.
Report mentions the possibility3 --to notice that clients who practice
commercialism are concerned with the common good, and that lawyers who
31. S. LETwIN, supra note 18, at 72.
32. 112 F.R.D. 243, 251 (1986). See also Stanley, supra note 8.
33. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 4. Macntyre makes a distinction between
"practices" and "institutions." Certain manifestations of the profession, as the A.B.A. talks
of it, may be practices- associations that form their members in the skills of craft and of
virtue. Institutions often corrupt practices, but institutions also support practices (as, say,
hospitals support local medical practices or universities support practices of teaching and
scholarship). In these terms, "commercialism" could perhaps be the institution and
commercial lawyers the practice.
34. 112 F.R.D. 243, 280 (1986).
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serve commercial interests serve the common good by serving the interest
their clients have in the common good. That is, though, an ethic of
complicity, and if you take it up you should be prepared (as the gentleman-
lawyer is) to follow it where it leads.
Another way to think about commercialism is to notice that the ethic of
the gentleman-lawyer is ironic: 35 I think of a cartoon I saw once, framed and
hanging on the wall in the office of the chief executive officer of a
manufacturing company. It showed a huge pipe dumping foul fluid from a
factory into a river. A businessman from the factory and two people from the
government were looking at the pipe. The businessman said, "Thank you for
bringing this to my attention." The cartoon would work as well if the speaker
had been the factory's lawyer.
(3) The argument against commercialism is odd also in seeming to say
that the Horatio Alger virtues that are celebrated in the American
entrepreneurial myth-taking risks, seizing opportunities, "exploiting the
moment" (as we learn from the DeadPoets Society)-are vices in the practice
of law. Competition, the Commission implied, is good in business but
demoralizing in the practice of law.
The gentleman-lawyer would not agree; he finds it possible, as the
gentleman in business does (I think of Howells's Silas Latham), to be an
entrepreneur, a competitor, and a gentleman. The A.B.A. Commission tends
to neglect our professional history, while rather stridently insisting that law
students should be forced not to neglect it.36 If the Commission were to
grapple with our history, it would reflect more usefully on the professionalism
that is in commerce and the commerce that is in professionalism. It would
then, perhaps, be less smug.37 It would then have been in a position to
ponder how to fit the altruism of pure service to the commercialism that
supports living well.
35. R. NIEBUHR, The Ironic Element in the American Situation, in THE IRONY OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 1-16 (1962).
36. 112 F.R.D. 243, 266 (1986).
37. The Commission notices that "some lawyers," due to pressures created by high
salaries and demands for "billable hours" to pay them, "engage in questionable practices,
including charging two different clients for the same period of time." Id. at 260. A
commercial non-lawyer might say she could find no question in such practices. She might
use the word theft to describe them, though.
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I conclude, on this first aspect of the issue of lawyer professionalism,
that it can make sense to admonish a lawyer to "be professional." The deepest
part of the argument is an ethic of character, an argument for the virtues, and
an argument that seems to be made in dependence on the persisting image and
spirit of the American gentleman-lawyer. The argument has possibilities, but
you cannot get very far with them until you begin to appreciate the dark side
of the enterprise.
II. BE IN THE PROFESSION
The other aspect of the personal morals of professionalism is the
admonition, "be in (of) the profession." This argument says that being in the
profession will make you a better person. If you are like other law students I
have known since I started living among law students, more than thirty years
ago, this admonition goes against the grain. You don't think the legal
profession will make you a better person. When you pay attention to your
recent moral drift, you are probably afraid the profession will make you
worse. You are on guard against its seductions and corruptions. You are
suspicious of the legal profession.3"
Before this argument is going to get anywhere-I can hear you
saying-you are going to have to know what this "profession" is that will
perfect your character. Is it the American Bar Association? No; I don't think
so. With very local or bucolic exceptions it is probably not any bar
association. 9
The gentleman-lawyer in American stories has not been much of a
joiner: Atticus Finch read for the Bar in an office, and he practiced alone.
38. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS, AND PEOPLE 35-58
(1977).
39. My argument for excluding bar associations is empirical: These associations have
functioned usefully as trade unions, and sometimes as rallying points for lawyers' concern
about inequality and inefficiency, but I have not noticed evidence to justify the admonition
that belonging to them will make me a good person. I do not think the A.B.A. campaign
argues that, and I'm sure the American gentleman-lawyer would not. This is not to
condemn bar associations, but is to say they are mostly among the "institutions" which
support "practices," as universities are institutions that support practices among scholars and
teachers. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 4 (describing "institutions" which support
"practices"). See also Rotunda, The Word "Profession" is Only a Label--and Not a Very
Useful One, LEARNING AND THE LAW 16 (1977); Rotunda, Lawyers and Professionalism:
A Commentary on the Report of the American Bar Association Commission on
Professionalism, 18 Loy. U. CIi. L.J. 1149 (1987).
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The only evident collaboration in his professional life is with the sheriff-and
that is a collaboration in government. The only organization his daughter
mentions his being a member of is the Methodist Church, which includes
lawyers but is not limited to them.
If Gavin Stevens ever attended a bar association meeting, Faulkner did
not notice. His moral associations were in his family and with a sewing
machine salesman.'
The association which has moral force in Auchincloss' lawyer stories is
the law firm, but Auchincloss' firms corrupt more than they ennoble.4
These stories do not suggest substance for the admonition to be in and
of the profession, because they make it hard to get hold of what "profession"
means. But the stories show how there might be a possibility for moral gain
in professional colleagueship, in that they show moral gain in other
associations: the church, the family, the old boys standing around in front of
the courthouse. Students-some students anyway-know about a
professional instance of that sort of moral gain from their associations in law
school. I want to take the associations our lawyer-heroes have in their
families, religious congregations, and communities, and add to them the
associations law students have with one another, and from those two oblique
sources suggest a meaning for "profession" that might be useful.
Friendship is at the heart of the sort of association I want to describe
here. The good qualities in my friend, and in me, are what attract us to one
another. We support one another in many ways, including the support we
give one another in becoming better people. We know that is so because we
40. Friends in Oxford tell me that the association Faulkner describes in the Snopes
novels, between Stevens and V.K. Ratliff, the sewing machine salesman, is based on
Faulkner's friendship with the Oxford lawyer Phil Stone. (Faulkner dedicated The Town,
his novel in which Ratliff is prominent, to Mr. Stone.) This may suggest that association
with lawyers may not be necessary for a lawyer, but association with at least one lawyer
may be ethically useful, if not necessary, for other citizens. See Stone, The Man and the
Land, in WILLIAM FAULKNER OF OXFORD (1965).
41. See Shaffer, supra note 9, at 386-87 (for a summary of contemporary critical
commentary). See also Shaffer, Henry Knox and the Moral Theology of Law Firms, 38
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1981). There is a stronger sense of professional colleagueship
in British trial-lawyer stories, not excluding Mortimer's Horace Rumpole stories. That
suggests an interesting comparison for professionalism in American law-firm stories, since,
although barristers share offices, they are not allowed to practice as firms-they are not
allowed to meet the world outside collectively.
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have been friends and we have made friends.42 Now, add to friendship the
fact that, in the law-school relationships I am thinking of, we are working
together on something that is important and hard to do. (My guess is that the
occasions that will come to your mind are study in groups, moot-court briefs,
practice-court-trial teams, team research projects, and working together on
clinical cases or on law-review essays.) What you now have is a friendship,
a moral association, that is substantively professional.43 Is it the case that
being in that sort of friendship makes you a better person? I am willing to
guess that the answer is yes.
Law firms often begin in one of these ways, and to the extent they
survive as professional friendship, law firms, or parts of them, form and
reform like this. Law faculties, and law departments in government and
business, or parts of them, are often professional friendships. More than half
of the lawyers in America practice by themselves; they appear to form
professional friendships in office-sharing arrangements, in small-community
courthouse society, and even in local bar associations. These illustrations
suggest substance for the idea of moral colleagueship among lawyers, a
substantive "profession" for the admonition to "be in the profession." (My
illustrations are not evidence. The life each of us leads with her or his friends
is where the evidence is.)
If you are with me so far, though, notice a few things about this
professional friendship. An important part of the payoff from being in it, as
Professor Freedman says," is not money or advancement or status. Some
42. T. SHAFFER, supra note 4, ch. 5.
43. It may spill over into social and familial colleagueship, it may even begin there,
but in the phase of it that I mean to notice it is a friendship in professional work. See
Shaffer, Collaboration in Studying Law, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 239 (1973); see also T.
SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, supra note 38, ch. 9. Not that I want to exclude the relatively
more social version of this: The old saw says lawyers are great people to drink with, but
that's not true. There are lawyers who are great people and do not drink. What is true is
that some of my friends are great people to drink with and lawyers as well; and some of my
friends are just lawyers. Are they my friends because they are lawyers? Yes, I may never
have thought of it that way before, but that is the case. We would not be friends if we were
not both (all) lawyers and, when I think about it, most of what we share as friends is "law
stuff." We share our work. We share our love for our work. We share what makes
lawyering fun.
44. Professor Freedman wrote:
In a free society that emphasizes individual dignity, personal autonomy, due
process of law, and equal protection of the laws, professionalism means that a
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of its rewards are interpersonal, but not interpersonal in a way that can be
separated from the craftsmanship of what we do together. This is a
colleagueship with reference to tasks, to work, and to service for pay, but an
important part of the good it provides us is, as Alasdair MacIntyre says,
internal.45
Broader hierarchical organizations do not provide professional
friendship. They support it and they seem often to frustrate and corrupt it.
The way law schools are built tends to turn them into bus stations, but it could
tend to turn them into places for friendships in learning and teaching law.
Some law firms encourage creative teamwork, others make it unlikely. My
guess is that bar associations do more to encourage professional friendship
when they appoint committees to reform the probate code than when they
sponsor golf outings or invite university professors to talk to their members
in hotel ballrooms. I think in this regard of Mr. Lichtenstein, both of his work
in labor-law committees of the Bar, and of his service to the Jewish
community in New York City.
The professional friendship I am talking about is always to a significant
extent a collaboration in skill. We become better at our craft because we
work together-we "extend" ourselves in our craft; we come closer to
understanding and accepting inherited standards of excellence in its practice.
Standards have authority among us-we come to agree about that-and we
recognize that our standards have come to us from our traditions and from our
teachers. Standards do not have authority because we accept them, but we
accept the authority they have. MacIntyre often uses examples from sport:
"If, on starting to play baseball, I do not accept that others know better than
lawyer (1) helps members of the public to be aware of their legal rights and of
the availability of legal services to achieve those rights; (2) advises each client
fully and candidly regarding the client's legal rights and moral obligations as
the lawyer sees them; and (3) zealously and competently uses all lawful means
to protect and advance the client's interests as the clients sees them after
thorough counseling. (4) The fact that a lawyer is earning a living by serving
as a lawyer is not material to whether the lawyer is acting in a professional
manner.
Letter from Monroe H. Freedman to Thomas L. Shaffer (Aug. 9, 1989). This threshold
framework is developed in M. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990).
45. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 190-91 (2d ed.
1984). Internal goods are goods specific to a practice. "[T]hey can only be identified and
recognized by the experience of participating in the practice ...." Id. at 188-89. The good
they provide is a common good. Id. at 190. See also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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I when to throw a fast ball and when not, I will never learn to appreciate good
pitching let alone to pitch." 6  This is true of interviewing clients, of
distinguishing cases, and of cross-examining expert witnesses.
The gains each of us makes in skill, in the skills of the craft as well as
in moral skill (virtue), are possessed by each of us without being taken away
from the rest of us. (Think of the moral and literary growth of the boys in the
Dead Poets Society.) It is characteristic of these gains "that in their
achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the
practice." 7
These gains depend on and support good habits among the professional
friends. When we work together on something important, we learn to be
honest with one another, we learn to be fair to one another, and we learn to act
with clarity and purpose. These good habits-disciplines-virtues-are also
skills we learn in the practice. The virtue words for these good habits are
truthfulness, justice, and courage.
I suggest that this is a way to make ethics out of the word profession. To
be in and of a profession, so defined, is a way to become a good person.
These practices are occupational extensions of friendship and, like friendship
itself, they are collaborations in the good. Friends make one another
better.4" Each of these friendships in work is a profession. Maybe they can
be carefully linked together, and can then be, for specific, temporary, and
limited purposes, a collected profession. Maybe bar associations are capable
of providing occasions for the temporary gathering. If the A.B.A. campaign
seeks this meaning for lawyer professionalism, and seeks this sort of
professionalism for lawyers, its campaign makes sense. But its arguments for
its claim-alas--do not make sense, and it is-alas-necessary to flay away
at some of the A.B.A. arguments, in order to see how arguments for such a
claim might make sense.
(1) The method of persuasion. Socrates said to Thrasymachus, we will
not define justice; we will instead show what justice is by the way we treat
one another as we talk together, about justice.49 The A.B.A. campaign aims
46. Id. at 190.
47. Id. at 190-91.
48. Aristotle, in what was perhaps a rare burst of hyperbole, said that friends share
more than justice, and so they have no need of justice.
49. "[I]f we proceed in our enquiry as we lately did, by making admissions to one
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to persuade law students to be in and of the profession. How might one go
about the task of persuasion, given that the way one goes about it will show
what the profession is and why a law student should want to be in it?
Professionalism as professional friendship would say that the first thing to do
is to listen. Socrates would say that seriousness in making a moral claim
means that you listen to what is said about the claim by those on whom the
claim is made. The A.B.A. would listen especially to the young who are
among those it is trying to form and persuade-because their minds still work
well, because we elders are trying to teach them to think, and they will not
learn to think if their teachers do not show respect for what they are thinking,
and because they are somewhat less likely than we are to buy into the
profession's settled self-deceptions. (The young have self-deceptions of their
own.)
From this Socratic point of view, the A.B.A. Report is a dismal piece of
attempted persuasion. Its section on training in professionalism in law school
proposes that law teachers instill the "principles of professionalism" in law
students. The Report calls for examinations and investigations, and for
forcing law students to watch videotapes in which "experienced lawyers"
discuss moral issues in a "Socratic" fashion. 0
Socrates would be appalled. None of that is education. None of it is
"professional." None of it is ethics. Ethics is talking together about morals.
Socrates did not set his students down and make them listen to him; he asked
questions and listened to them. This has been the way of ethics from
Abraham and Moses to Aristotle and Cicero, from Jesus and the Rabbis of the
Talmud to Professor Monroe Freedman. Especially Professor Monroe
Freedman, who understands and teaches, better than anyone who works in
legal ethics, that ethics does not instill principles. Ethics questions
principles." God made us to serve Him, as Bolt's Thomas More said, "in
the tangle of the mind." The first step in any serious claim about
professionalism as a moral value would be to subject the notion of
professionalism to the most irreverent law students the Commission could
find. Not the ones who seek office in the Law Student Division, but the ones
who would not be caught dead at a bar-association meeting. What the A.B.A.
another, we shall unite the offices of judge and advocate in our own persons." The
Republic, Book I, in THE DIALOGuEs OF PLATO 613 (I. B. Jowett trans. 1937).
50. 112 F.R.D. 243, 267 (1986).
51. Freedman, Two Fables, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1988, at 57.
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shows in its recipe for legal education in professionalism is that it is afraid of
its children.
The Commission's approach to practicing lawyers is more plausible as
education and as ethics. The Report encourages "retreats" for law firms and
truth-discovering discussion within law firms and among lawyers from
different firms.52 It invokes, as to practitioners but not as to students, the
virtue of friendship. Socrates, if he were in town, might even go to one of
these retreats. I don't think he would darken the door of the ideal A.B.A. law
school.53
(2) The issue of lawyer income. All of the world seems prepared to
admit that lawyers are becoming unavailable for ordinary people, and that the
reason for this is that lawyers cost too much. I am surprised that no one who
worries about this situation has thought to compare us to the clergy. The
clergy are still available to ordinary people, they aspire as much as lawyers
do to be professionals, and they aspire to have a profession. But they don't
cost as much as we do. The clergy, alone among the traditional professions
in America, seems to have come upon the moral equivalent of money. You
can tell it by looking at the old cars they drive, the cheap vacations they take,
and the fact that they send their children to public colleges.
The professionalism campaign would gain credibility if it would talk
truthfully about the moral equivalent of money in the terms such a
comparison might lead to-about the material life of lawyers. Instead, the
Commission talks of the acquisition of wealth. Lawyers, the Report says,
"should.. .resist the temptation to make the acquisition of wealth a primary
goal of law practice."'  The chairman of the Commission said, "[t]o
substitute for high professional competence and dedication the amassing of
wealth is fundamentally wrong. '55 This defines the question of income in
such a way that almost everybody gets off the hook-from the seven-figure
partner in the big law firm, to the six-figure law teachers who scoff at such
opulence, to the second-year student who wonders about her high five-figure
start in one of those firms.
52. 112 F.R.D. 243, 272 (1986).
53. T. SHAFFER, supra note 4, ch. 6 (exploring that possibility, as to Socrates in the
habit of an Irish monk).
54. 112 F.R.D. 243, 300 (1986).
55. Stanley, supra note 8.
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We lawyers don't want to amass wealth, the Report says; wealth is the
furthest thing from our minds. Lawyers, as Daniel Webster said, live well,
but they die poor. Students who pant for those seductive Wall Street starting
salaries think of them as a way to pay back loans while they live as well as
Ann Kelsey and Victor Sifuentes do. They do not want to get rich. Partners
who complain about associates' salaries are not amassing wealth; they are
living well.56
We don't have to consult the clergy, if you would rather not. A
Commission of lawyers from other countries--Canada, Britain, West
Germany, Italy-would have got this issue right. Those lawyers are still in
the middle class. They live more like American clergy than like American
lawyers. They would say to their American colleagues, "You live too well.
That's why you cannot help ordinary people. The acquisition of wealth is not
the problem. This 'living well' you talk about is the problem. The issue for
professionalism is whether your profession can deal with the corruption that
'living well' brings to the possibility of being a profession, to the possibilities
of professional friendship and a 'spirit of public service.' You seem to value
comfort more than the virtue of craftsmanship or the craftsmanship of virtue.
You have lawyers in America whose earnings are modest, but, in your talk of
professionalism, you imply that they are failures. You speak of service but
56. The Wall Street partners I know make a lot of money, but they do not live well.
They work ninety hours a week so that somebody else can live well. My colleague Walter
F. Pratt, Jr., pointed out that fear of the corrosive effects of "commercialism" was prominent
in the early formation of the American republican vision. He advises: "The consensus
seemed to be that no government over such a large area could succeed without a virtuous
people. But there was disagreement about how to preserve that virtue, with some arguing
that only those who owned sufficient property could be virtuous, since they depended on
no one else for income. Those property owners were distinguished from merchants (those
in 'commerce') who could not be virtuous because they depended upon others for their
income. In that light, commercialism was seen as a vice which threatened the very
existence of the nation." See also Banning, Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the
Course of Revolutionary Thinking, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTIoN 194
(1988); Pangle, Federalists and the Idea of 'Virtue,' in THE CONSTrrUTON, (Winter 1984).
Republican political theory and virtue as the basis of legal ethics were associated in David
Hoffman's doctrine. See supra note 9. Hoffman was both the first of the legal ethicists and
a passionate Whig. See Bloomfield, David Hoffman and the Shaping of a Republican Legal
Culture, 38 MD. L. REV. 673 (1979). What may be hopeful here, for modem thinking about
legal ethics, is that, while these early republicans argued about the best way to preserve
virtue, they seem to have agreed on what virtue is and on its importance.
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you accept material aspirations that impair the possibility of service.""7
IH. CONCLUSION
Does it make sense to admonish an American lawyer to "be
professional"? Yes, it makes sense. Being professional is a way to be and to
become a good person. But none of us can explore any seriously proposed
avenue to goodness without first being truthful about what is going on around
us. And the truth is that morally serious professionalism brings us face to
face with the tragic character of professional life."
Does it make sense to admonish an American lawyer to "be in and of a
profession"? Yes; that, too, makes sense, because we become better people
when we flourish among friends. We become better people and craftsmen as
well-good lawyers-in moral friendship with other lawyers. There are sober
moments there, too, of course; the colleagueship would not be moral if there
weren't. One of these may be when colleagues look at one another and say,
"What are we up to?" and when they then listen to the answers of their
friends. 9
57. My friend, Stanley Hauerwas, after reading an early draft of this essay, wrote,
with regard to lawyer income:
[Y]our point about lawyers and wealth... might be spelled out a bit more in
terms of MacIntyre's understanding of the relationship between practice and
institutions necessary to support the practice.... [T]he institutions might well
pervert the practice in a way that makes it well nigh impossible to appreciate
the continued viability of the practice itself. . . . [T]hat would be a way of
spelling out that issue without it being seen as just an attack on making money.
See supra note 33.
58. There is more to this point than the instance of it I have discussed here-the ethic
of complicity among gentlemen-lawyers. See Shaffer, The Professional Ethics of
Individualism and Tragedy in Martin Arrowsmith's Expedition to St. Hubert, 54 MO. L.
REv. 259 (1989).
59. I am grateful for the advice of Harlan R. Beckley, Roger C. Cramton, Monroe H.
Freedman, Jimmy Gurule, Stanley Hauerwas, Walter F. Pratt, Jr., Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Jack
L. Sammons, Andrew P. Shaffer, Edward L. Shaffer, Mary M. Shaffer, Nancy J. Shaffer,
and Francis D. Shaffer of the Tacoma, Washington Bar.
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